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Objectives: A recent study showed that estimates of cost-effectiveness submitted to
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) by manufacturers had
significantly lower incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) than those submitted by
university-based Assessment Groups. This study extends that analysis.
Methods: Data were abstracted from relevant NICE documentation for thirty-two of
eighty-two possible appraisals.
Results: The results from the analysis showed that sources of the difference in ICERs
appear to be the effectiveness estimates relating to the comparator technology and the
cost estimates relating to the technology under evaluation. That is, manufacturers
estimated lower average benefits for the comparator technology and lower costs relating
to the technology under evaluation compared with estimates submitted by the
Assessment Groups.
Conclusions: These findings may be particularly important, given the introduction of the
“Single Technology Appraisal.” Considerable difficulties were encountered when
undertaking this study, highlighting, above all else, the complexity of explaining why
results from economic evaluations purporting to answer the same question diverge.
Keywords: Cost-effectiveness analysis; Bias (epidemiology); Drug industry; Technology
assessment, biomedical
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in the United Kingdom issues guidance on the use of
specific healthcare technologies based on evidence relat-
ing to clinical and cost-effectiveness. The criterion used in
this program to assess cost-effectiveness is the incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), defined as the difference in
costs between two technologies divided by the difference
in their benefits (see Equation 1). For a technology that in-
creases both costs and benefits of intervention, the lower the
ICER, the more cost-effective a technology, and the higher
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priority it should receive in terms of funding, all else being
equal.
ICER = C
E
= CB − CA
EB − EA (1)
where C = Incremental Costs
E = Incremental Benefits
CA = cost of comparator technology
CB = cost of technology under evaluation
EA = health effects of comparator technology
EB = health effects of technology under evaluation
For each technology passing through the TAP, evi-
dence is submitted by the relevant manufacturer, and profes-
sional and national patient groups. At the same time, NICE
(through the NHS Research and Development Health Pro-
gramme) commissions an academic center called an Assess-
ment Group (AG) to provide an assessment of the evidence.
Guidance to the NHS is formulated with regard to the to-
tality of this evidence base, including information on cost-
effectiveness.
Both the AG and, usually, each manufacturer submit
an economic evaluation for each appraisal. In 2005, Miners
et al. showed that ICERs submitted by manufacturers were
significantly more optimistic (or less pessimistic) compared
with claims made by the AGs (8). However, no attempt was
made to identify which parameters were responsible for this
discrepancy. This information would be useful for those cri-
tiquing studies and ultimately for decision makers who need
to be able to justify preferences for using the results from
one economic evaluation over another. At a more strategic
level, this information could also help to inform guidelines
for assessing and appraising economic evidence.
METHODS
We denote the costs and effects for the manufacturer with
subscript M (for example, CBM is the cost of technology
under evaluation reported by M) and for the AG by G (for
example, CBG). The aim of this study was to compare the
degree of similarity between:
• (CBM − CAM) and (CBG − CAG), (i)
• (EBM − EAM) and (EBG − EAG), (ii)
• CBM and CBG, (iii)
• CAM and CAG, (iv)
• EBM and EBG, and (v)
• EAM and EAG (vi)
Data on incremental costs, incremental benefits, and individ-
ual components of the relevant ICER (CBM, CAM, EBM, and
EAM; CBG, CAG, EBG, and EAG) were collected for Technol-
ogy Appraisal numbers 1 to 82 using the following sources:
the Assessment Report (the report submitted by the AG), each
manufacturer’s submission, Overview (a summary written by
the technology analyst at NICE assigned to the appraisal), fi-
nal NICE guidance, and electronic versions of the models.
Where stated, data relating to base case assumptions were
collected. Individual appraisals were excluded from the anal-
ysis if either the manufacturer or the AG did not produce a
cost-effectiveness estimate. In addition, the health benefits
had to be measured in the same units within each appraisal.
For example, if the ICER from one source was expressed
using QALYs (quality-adjusted life-years), then the ICER
from the other source would also have to be expressed using
QALYs.
Several appraisals contained more than one ICER. The
calculation of multiple ICERs in some appraisals leads to a
clustering effect in the statistical analysis. To counteract this
effect, a mean value for each of the four components of the
ICER for both the Assessment Group and the manufacturer
was calculated so that there would only be one pair-wise
comparison per appraisal. Data were also collected on the
length of the time horizon to see whether this finding differed
on average between the manufacturer and AG submissions.
Analysis
A simple test of whether the EM = EBM − EAM (incremen-
tal benefits in manufacturer submission) is different from
EG = EBG − EAG (incremental benefits in the Assessment
Report) may be constructed by assuming that EM = EG
as a null hypothesis and using a binomial distribution with
p = .5 to determine whether the proportion of times that
EM exceeded EG or vice versa was sufficiently unlikely
by chance. The reason that the signs of EM and EG, rather
than their actual magnitudes, are used, is that the appraisals
are measuring magnitudes with means and variances that
differ between appraisals. This test was repeated for compar-
isons (ii) to (vi) above, again using a sign test.
For each of the appraisals, the average of the time hori-
zons for both the Assessment Group and the manufacturer
were calculated so that there was only one pair-wise com-
parison per appraisal. A Wilcoxon sign rank test was then
carried out to see whether there was a difference between the
time horizon used by the manufacturer and the Assessment
Group.
Scaling Issues
A technical problem that needs consideration arises because
the ICER is a ratio. Even if the individual components, de-
nominator and numerator, are different in the manufacturer
submission and Assessment Report, the overall ICER might
still be the same. This is demonstrated by equation 2 below:
CBM − CAM
EBM − EAM =
S.CBM − S.CAM
S.EBM − S.EAM =
CBG − CAG
EBG − EAG (2)
If all the individual components in one submission
are multiples of the individual components in the other
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submission and S in equation 2 is not equal to 1, then a
scaling effect exists. In that case, the difference between the
individual components of the Assessment Group’s model and
their respective components in the manufacturer’s model may
not be “real.” Scaling effects may occur because the average
severity of disease among the patients within the model of
one submission may be greater than in the other submission
or the time horizons used in the two submissions may differ.
Suppose without loss of generality that S > 1. Then
CBG − CAG will exceed CBM − CAM, and for the same rea-
son, EBG − EAG will exceed EBM − EAM. Thus the sign of
(CBG − CAG) − (CBM − CAM) = C, say, will be the same as
that of (EBG − EAG) − (EBM − EAM) = E, say. The same will
be the case if S < 1, so a test of whether there is a scaling
effect is whether the sign of E and the sign of C are positively
correlated, using a binomial distribution with p = .5.
In the same way, there may be a scaling effect in only
the A components or only the B components of the ICER.
That is, possibly EBG = S.EBM and CBG = S.CBM (and there
is no scaling effect with the comparator technology) or
EAG = S.EAM and CAG = S.CAM (and there is no scaling ef-
fect with the technology under evaluation).
The discussion of the scaling effect assumes that
the ICER for the manufacturers would otherwise be the
same as the ICER for the AG. Because this will not be so,
the significance level (p value) estimated on the basis that
the ICERs are the same will probably overstate the true
p value and, therefore, be conservative.
RESULTS
Of eighty-two appraisals, fifty were excluded for the follow-
ing reasons: the Assessment Group alone did not produce an
ICER (n= 24), there was no manufacturer/the manufacturer
did not produce an ICER (n= 8), both the Assessment Group
and the manufacturer did not produce an ICER (n= 1), dif-
ferent measures of health benefit were used (n= 8) or the
four components of the ICER were not available for analysis
from AG, manufacturer, or both (n= 9). Table 1 summarizes
the results concerning the denominator, numerator, and indi-
vidual components of the ICER as defined in the statistical
analysis.
Table 1. Results of Statistical Analysis
Proportion of manufacturer estimates p
Statistic exceeding AG estimates value
CM vs. CG 8/32 .004
EM vs. EaG 21/29 .012
CBM vs. CBG 9/32 .010
CAM vs. CAG 14/32 .298
EBM vs. EaBG 13/29 .355
EAM vs. EaAG 7/29 .004
a Three appraisals were excluded as they were cost-minimization analyses
and, therefore, did not include a measure of health benefit.
To make an ICER more favorable (Equation 1), either the
incremental effectiveness must increase (ceteris paribus), or
the incremental costs must decrease (ceteris paribus). Manu-
facturers’ reported incremental costs (C) were higher than
those reported by the AGs in 25 percent of submissions
(p = .004). Conversely the incremental benefits (E) were
higher among the manufacturer submission in 72 percent of
submissions (p = .012).
Regarding the four individual components of the ICER,
a more favorable ICER would result if CA or EB were in-
creased or if CB or EA were decreased. Statistically signifi-
cant differences (at the 5 percent level) were recorded for CB
and EA, and both were in the anticipated direction (Table 1).
Differences between manufacturer and AG estimates for CA
and EB were not statistically significant.
SCALING EFFECTS
Of the three tests of whether a scaling effect operates, pre-
sented in Tables 2–4, two are not significant at the 5 percent
level and, for the third (scaling effect in the comparator), the
p value is .031. If the significance tests in Tables 3 and 4 are
independent, the Bonferroni correction for multiple testing
would indicate that the critical p value for these two tests
taken together would be .025, suggesting that the p value of
Table 3 of .031 is not significant. As the tests are probably
not independent, the significance of the .031 value is, there-
fore, indeterminate on this criterion alone. However, as stated
above, the test is also likely to undervalue the true p (because
there are effects other than scaling present) so the chance that
.031 is significant is likely to be low. Additionally, if it ex-
isted at all, the scaling effect would be present only within
the comparator and it does not apparently exist overall (Table
2). Overall, the evidence for the existence of a scaling effect
is, therefore, relatively weak, but is not completely ruled out.
Table 2. Analysis of Scaling Effect: Two by two matrix com-
paring the sign of C(M) −C(G) and E(M) −E(G)a
E(M) −E(G)
Positive Negative
C(M) −C(G) Positive 6 2
Negative 15 6
a Statistical analysis: same sign = 12; different sign = 17 (p = .87).
Table 3. Analysis of Scaling Effect: Two by Two Matrix Com-
paring the Sign of EBM − EBG and CBM − CBGa
EBM − EBG
Positive Negative
CBM − CBG Positive 6 2
Negative 7 14
a Statistical analysis: same sign = 20; different sign = 9 (p = .031).
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Table 4. Analysis of Scaling Effect: Two by Two Matrix Com-
paring the Sign of EAM − EAG and CAM − CAGa
EAM − EAG
Positive Negative
CAM − CAG Positive 2 10
Negative 5 12
a Statistical analysis: same sign = 14; different sign = 15 (p = .64).
Time Horizon
When comparing the time horizon data, two more appraisals
were excluded, which left a dataset of thirty appraisals.
Twelve of the time horizons were greater in the manufacturer
submission compared with that of the Assessment Group,
nine of the time horizons were greater in the Assessment Re-
port, and in nine of the appraisals the time horizon used was
the same. Given a null hypothesis of equality for the length
of the time horizons between submission source, and on the
basis that only the direction of the difference and not the
magnitude matters, no significant difference in time horizon
was found (p = .841).
DISCUSSION
Previous research has shown that studies sponsored by indus-
try were more likely to have lower ICERs than nonindustry
sources (1;3–5;7). Such differences should theoretically not
be so apparent within NICE’s TAP, as the manufacturer and
AG estimates of the ICER are calculated at the same time,
often using the same studies to populate the economic anal-
ysis; however, Miners et al. observed that the technology
manufacturers submitting to NICE made claims of better
cost-effectiveness compared with university-based AGs (8).
The purpose of this study was to assess where the differences
within the submissions had occurred.
The results from this analysis showed that AGs tended
to estimate larger differences in cost (C) between the com-
peting technologies compared with the manufacturers. The
analysis also showed that estimates of incremental effective-
ness (E) provided by the AGs were more likely to be smaller
compared with the manufacturer estimates. These results are
consistent with the observation reported by Miners et al.,
insofar as greater cost differences and smaller treatment ef-
fects, both associated with the AGs in this study, would tend
to generate larger ICERs.
Further analysis of the data suggested that the differences
in incremental costs (C) and effects (E) were the result of
two factors. First, discrepancies between the expected costs
of the technology under evaluation (CB) provided by both
parties were recorded (AGs tended to estimate larger average
costs compared with the manufacturers). Second, differences
between the estimated effectiveness of the comparator tech-
nology (EA) were also recorded (AGs tend to estimate larger
expected effectiveness values compared with the manufac-
turer). No statistically significant differences between the
costs of the comparator and the effects of the technology un-
der evaluation between the AGs and the manufacturers were
observed.
An original study objective was to delve deeper into
the evaluations in an attempt to identify specific reasons for
differences in reported ICERs in terms of specific input pa-
rameters (e.g., relative risks of disease progression or drug
prices). However, because the design and structure of the
decision models varied so markedly within each appraisal,
and because the methods and results from evaluations were
not always well reported, the task was abandoned for all but
the time horizon of the evaluations. Thus it is only possible
to indicate potential areas where analysts should focus their
critical appraisal skills rather than to highlight a particular set
of input parameters per se. This is an interesting observation
insofar as a frequent task for NICE’s Technology Appraisal
Committees is to explain why results from seemingly similar
economic evaluations differ, and in so doing, explain their
decision for placing more weight on the results from one
evaluation over another in a coherent, logical, and defensible
manner. That our attempt at doing this was abandoned high-
lights the complexity and difficulty of the Committee’s task,
although better reporting of study methods and results would
have helped to reduce this problem.
NICE has recently introduced its “Single Technology
Appraisal” (STA) program (9). It differs in several ways
from NICE’s traditional appraisal approach, but perhaps the
main difference, in terms of method, is that only product
manufacturers submit evidence. The AG’s complete role is
currently unclear, but appears to be limited to critically ap-
praising this evidence rather than substantially adding to it.
STA may put the burden of proof on one party, which Bux-
ton and Akehurst state may lead to increased rejections (2),
but a potential advantage may be that the Committee will
no longer need to compare often seemingly incomparable
decision models (6). The limited scope for the AG review
of manufacturers’ submission within the STA process under-
lines the need for a focused approach. This study shows that
systematic differences may exist for CB and EA between the
manufacturer submissions and the Assessment Report, and,
therefore, may provide suggestions for where the AG should
focus its analysis in the STA.
There are several limitations with this study. The prob-
lem of what we have called the Scaling Effect and the fact
that we have only weak evidence for its nonexistence has al-
ready been outlined. Additionally, collecting the data was
problematic in that value judgments were often required
when abstracting the data. For example, the base case sce-
nario was not always clearly identifiable, and appraisals
often included multiple treatment comparisons. However,
where value judgments were required, they were made
with respect to minimizing possible differences between
variables.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
There are two main implications of this study. First, it is
suggested that reviewers of economic evaluations pay par-
ticular attention to the methods used to estimate technology
costs and comparator health effects when attempting to rec-
oncile differences in reported ICERs across different stud-
ies. Second, Institutes such as NICE that are responsible for
reimbursement decisions are encouraged to fully debate the
pros and cons of receiving independent- and/or manufacturer-
sponsored economic evaluations as broadly outlined by Bux-
ton and Akehurst (2).
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